In memory of Archer K Blood (1923-2004)

A Friend of Bangladesh

In March 1971 when Honorable Archer Blood was the Consul General of United States of America in Dacca, Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan), we, the common people, immersed as we were in the tumultuous politics of Independent Bangladesh movement, were not aware of him. To many of us, he was just another foreign diplomat doing his time in the back waters of East Pakistan.

On March 28, days after the brutal attack by the Pakistani Army on a defenseless people, when our world seemed to have come to an end, a broadcast on the BBC World service made us all and the world at large acquainted with Mr. Blood. His was a message of hope assuring us that we were not alone, that there were men of goodwill who were outraged by what had happened in Dacca, and that they were willing to risk their careers in the US Foreign Service so that the truth came out in the open and prevailed.

Mr. Blood sent an urgent telegram dated March 28, 1971, addressed to the US Secretary of State in Washington DC, which began with the words: “In Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror of the Pak military.” A few days later, on April 6, 1971, Mr. Blood, as the senior signatory, along with 20 of his colleagues in the Dacca Consulate, sent to his superiors in Washington the following note, which became later known as the Blood Telegram:

“Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan- dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya Khan a message defending democracy, condemning the arrest of a leader of a democratically-elected majority party, incidentally pro-West, and calling for an end to repressive measures and bloodshed.... But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional civil servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected.”

For this moral courage and compassionate candor he annoyed his superiors in the Embassy in Islamabad and the Nixon Administration in Washington and paid a heavy personal price in terms of his career. Bangladesh was, to Washington, just a sideshow that should be managed regardless of the cost in human suffering which involved nearly 3 million dead and over 10 million refugees in Bangladesh. It would not be permitted to interfere with Washington's plans for the grand opening to China in which Pakistan was assigned the role of a facilitator. However, the people of Bangladesh fought back with direct-indirect help from conscientious citizens like Archer Blood. Soon the rest of the world became aware of the genocide and as Mr. Blood predicted in his first telegram, the world saw a “Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of independent Bangladesh.”

We the people of Bangladesh will never forget Mr. Archer Blood and his band of courageous colleagues in the Dacca mission. They reminded us in our night of terror and days of torture that the world was not devoid of moral integrity, brotherly solidarity, and human compassion. Mr. Archer Blood, by one big gesture of magnanimity and moral stand, became our ambassador. We Bangladeshis are bereft in his demise as no one else. Therefore, in gratitude and grief, we mourn his sad departure and our great loss with deep sorrow and utmost respect. A whole nation mourns and memorializes him. All of Bangladesh wails today: Adieu, sleep well, gentle friend!

Robin Khundkar,
Tanweer Akram,
Lopa Tasneem,
Asif Saleh,
Naeem Mohaiemen,
Ikram Ahmed, and
I. K. Shukla
On behalf of the People of Bangladesh

September 17, 2004

Despite the famous alleged 'tilt' of the US government in favour of Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, many in Pakistan believe that America, one of the two super powers in those days, had played a role in the separation of the eastern wing. The book under review has been written by an American diplomat and is an attempt at proving that the 'tilt' was confined merely to the top and the sympathy for Pakistan, if any, was too ineffectual to prevent any US official from taking sides. Of course, one reason for this was the mishandling of the situation by the then president of Pakistan and his military and political advisors.

Archer K. Blood, the author of The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh, was the US Consul General in East Pakistan from March 1970 to June 1971. The book extensively quotes from the now de-classified diplomatic cables between the US consulate in Dhaka and the embassy in Islamabad or the State Department in Washington. They describe and comment on the situation in the area. As such it reflects the perceptions of the author and his colleagues in the US Foreign Service about the events of that period.

Regarding the developments preceding the fateful December 7 elections, the author writes that he never considered the Six Points to be "a viable programme". But the Awami League's strong commitment to it and the vehement opposition to some of these points from the West Pakistanis had led him to believe that even if the Six Points were adopted after some modifications, the experiment would fail leading to the separation of the two wings.

According to him, Mujib made several attempts, before and after the elections, to involve the US government in the matter but following the official policy of neutrality both, the consul general in Dhaka and the Ambassador in Islamabad, did not respond to it. However, things began to change after the indefinite postponement of the March 3 session of the National Assembly.

When Yahya Khan announced his intention to go to Dhaka for talks with Mujib, the latter sent a representative to the consul general to request him to advise his government to urge upon the president to work for a "political solution" of the crisis. Under the circumstances then existing, this would have called for a confederation of the two wings. Consul general Blood obliged the Awami League leader. But the suggestion was turned down by Washington as it would have been considered an "unwarranted interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs, lending substance to suspicions in West Pakistan that the US supports separatism".

Yahya arrived in Dhaka on March 15, which was, as pointed out by the author, the Ides of March. By March 23, an agreed plan for the transfer of power seemed to be in sight. But the next day Mujib sent word to Blood that being under pressure from military hawks, Yahya might back out and requested the US government to urge Yahya to work for a 'political solution'. The consul general informed Ambassador Farland of Mujib's apprehensions but added that there was nothing to substantiate his fears. Accordingly, the ambassador did not take the action requested by Mujib.

But Mujib's fears were not unfounded. Yahya, opting for the military solution, left Dhaka in the evening of March 25 and soon after, the army crackdown began. That transformed the situation for many, including the author. His reports became so eloquent about the excesses of the army that his own colleagues in the US Embassy in Islamabad and many of them in the State Department in Washington refused to believe them. However, he continued to report with the same tempo.

On April 6 a cable, sent on behalf of himself and his officers, expressed strong dissent on the US policy towards Pakistan and urged the US government to give up appeasing the West Pakistan dominated government in Islamabad and to intervene to stop the "genocide" in the east wing. Further, the consul general expressed the opinion that since the struggle would result in the establishment of an independent Bangladesh, it would be foolish to continue supporting the likely loser.

As the author learnt later, nine officers at the State Department who had specialized in South Asian affairs, sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State supporting the views expressed in the cable and asking for the suggested measures to be taken immediately.

One curious aspect with respect to this cable was that although its contents were of highly sensitive nature, it was marked simply as "confidential" with no distribution restriction. As a result of this low classification, the contents were leaked immediately creating a furore in the US media. The dissent was also reported elsewhere, including India. Blood was accused by his superiors of "having deliberately put a lower classification on the message with the hope that it would be leaked". The author accepts that he was at fault but maintains that it was out of "carelessness, not malignance".

But it is hard to believe that Mr Blood, a seasoned and highly efficient diplomat, could be so careless, particularly when only a few days earlier another incident of leakage of his report had caused considerable embarrassment to his government and to Ambassador Farland. On March 27, two days after the army's action in the east wing, the BBC, All India Radio and the VOA had reported, quoting the US consul general in Dhaka as its source, heavy fighting in the city. Farland was immediately called to the Pakistan Foreign Office and an "emphatic perturbance" was registered on the incident in which another US government agency, the VOA, was also involved.

The Ambassador was doubly embarrassed because not only was a US diplomat quoted as the source of a highly damaging report but also because it implied that the US consulate in Dhaka was using an unauthorized transmitter link to send messages, as all authorized links had been cut off.

Perhaps it was this kind of reporting and its persistent leakage that led to the author's recall from Dhaka. But it also earned for him the Herter Award instituted by the American Foreign Service Association, for his "creative dissent". The award was given personally by the Secretary of State Rogers on June 24, 1971 while the crisis in East Pakistan was still unresolved.

Given the subject of the book and the direct involvement of the author in the crisis, what he writes is of great importance to the readers in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It certainly sheds light on a significant aspect of our own political history.

__________________________________________________
The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat
By Archer K. Blood
The University Press Limited, Dhaka
For more info log on to www.uplbooks.com
Email: upl@bangla.net
ISBN 984 05 1650 7
373 pp. (Price not listed)
(The Dawn, December 14, 2003)

Last updated: October 2004